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RESCUING MANUFACTURED HOUSING
FROM THE PERILS OF MUNICIPAL
ZONING LAWS
INTRODUCTION
Rising housing costs in the United States' have prompted some
home buyers to choose mobile homes as an affordable alternative to
site-built homes.2 Unfortunately, new mobile home owners3 encounter
municipal ordinances which exclude mobile homes from single-family
zoning areas, often confining them to mobile home parks.4 City coun-
cils enact these ordinances because of historical prejudices against mo-
bile homes.5  However, advanced technology involved in mobile
1. The average price of a new home in November, 1988, was $138,900. Current
Developments, Hous. & DEv. REP. 797 (BNA Jan. 23, 1989).
2. United States Bureau of the Census: Construction Reports (Nov. 1986) reported
the average price of a single-width manufactured home in 1985 was $21,800.
3. A total of 232,800 manufactured homes were sold in 1987. Current Develop-
ments, Hous. & DEv. REP. 797 (BNA Jan. 23, 1989).
4. One such ordinance provides:
The city council.., hereby finds and declares that the indiscriminate placement of
mobile homes and trailers on individual building lots in the residential zones of the
city threatens irreparable damage to residential property values within the city.
The city council further finds and declares that, in order to protect residential
property values, to preserve the intent of the city's comprehensive plan, and to
promote the general safety and welfare of the City of Lewiston and the residents
thereof, mobile homes shall be located only within mobile home parks, mobile
home subdivisions, and mobile home planned unit developments, except in emer-
gency situations, as hereinafter provided.
City of Lewiston v. Knieriem, 107 Idaho 80, 82-83, 685 P.2d 821, 823-824 (1984).
5. See Note, Toward an Equitable and Workable Program of Mobile Home Taxa-
tion, 71 YALE L.J. 702, 702-03 (1962):
Community fear of blight can be traced to the low quality of both the early trailers
and their parking facilities. Economic conditions of the 'thirties, followed by war-
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homes, or manufactured housing,6 renders these prejudices obsolete.
To set a precedent in municipal legislatures and courtrooms, state leg-
islatures should draft progressive provisions to discourage restrictive
mobile home zoning ordinances and to ease the burden of expensive
housing.
Part I of this Note examines the outdated theories which prompt
legislatures to enact ordinances that discriminate against manufactured
housing. These theories do not apply to the modem manufactured
home. Part II explores judicial treatment of city ordinances. This sec-
tion focuses on the superficial treatment that the majority of courts
give exclusionary ordinances. Part III emphasizes the need for state
legislative action and reviews the currently inadequate state statutes.
Finally, Part IV describes a progressive state statute and the requisite
provisions.
PART I: THE UNFAIRNESS OF LOCAL ORDINANCES
To justify discriminatory zoning ordinances, city officials claim that
mobile homes are unsafe and dangerous. By exercising state police
time housing shortages and rapid relocations of the labor force, pressed many
thousands of unattractive trailers into permanent use. Often these units were with-
out running water or sanitary facilities. There were no construction standards to
insure even minimum protection against fire or collapse. They were parked in ar-
eas which were usually crowded, poorly equipped, and generally unsuited to resi-
dential use. As a result, conditions in these parks seldom exceeded minimum
health and sanitation standards. The specter of such parks teeming with tiny trail-
ers made community apprehension understandable. But substantial improvements
in the quality of both mobile homes and park facilities may have undermined the
bases for this antipathy today. The mobile home currently produced is an attrac-
tive, completely furnished, efficiently spacious dwelling for which national con-
struction standards have been adopted and enforced by the manufacturers'
associations.
Id.
6. A "manufactured home," as defined by 42 U.S.C. § 5402 (1974), is a:
structure, transportable in one or more sections, which, in the traveling mode, is
eight body feet or more in width or forty body feet or more in length, or, when
erected on site, is three hundred twenty or more square feet, and which is built on a
permanent chassis and designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a perma-
nent foundation when connected to the required utilities, and includes the plumb-
ing, heating, air-conditioning, and electrical systems contained therein; except that
such term shall include any structure which meets all the requirements of this par-
agraph except the size requirements and with respect to which the manufacturer
voluntarily files a certification required by the Secretary and complies with stan-
dards established under this chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 5402(6).
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power, municipalities can regulate health and safety interests.7 One
concern is that manufactured homes are not durable. The necessity of
being transported, plus unit setup and takedown, subjects manufac-
tured homes to possible degradation.' Fire safety is another area of
concern.
9
The National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Stan-
dards Act,'0 however, has addressed" and minimized health and
safety problems with manufactured housing.12 Research by the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development suggests that compli-
ance with HUD standards in the Act significantly reduces degradation
by seventy-five percent on all the tested models.1 Consequently, the
7. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Mobile, 245 Ala. 80, 16 So. 2d 1 (1943); Cooper v.
Sinclair, 66 So. 2d 702 (Fla. en bane), cert denied, 346 U.S. 867 (1953); Village of
Matherville v. Brown, 34 111. App. 3d 298, 339 N.E.2d 346 (1975); Colby v. Hurtt, 212
Kan. 113, 509 P.2d 1142 (1973); Warren v. Municipal Officers of Gorham, 431 A.2d
624 (Me. 1981); Wright v. Michaud, 160 Me. 164, 200 A.2d 543 (1964); Town of
Granby v. Landry, 341 Mass. 443, 170 N.E.2d 364 (1960); Courtland Township v.
Cole, 66 Mich. App. 474, 239 N.W.2d 630 (1976); State v. Larson, 292 Minn. 350, 195
N.W.2d 180 (1972); State ex rel Wilkerson v. Murray, 471 S.W.2d 460 (Mo.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971); Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 150
A.2d 481 (1959); People v. Clute, 47 Misc. 2d 1005, 263 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1965), aff'd, 18
N.Y.2d 999, 224 N.E.2d 734 (1966); Mobile Home of Chattanooga v. Hamilton
County, 552 S.W.2d 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 956 (1977); City
of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1087
(1982); Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978);
Town of Stonewood v. Bell, 270 S.E.2d 787 (W.Va. 1980) (courts held that ordinances
which regulate manufactured housing locations bear a substantial relationship to public
health, safety, and general welfare).
8. T. NUTT-POWELL, MANUFACTURED HOUSES: MAKING SENSE OF A HOUSING
OPPORTUNITY 23 (1982). HUD focused its durability research upon transportation im-
pacts. Id.
9. Id. at 25-30. Congress' primary motivation for passing the HUD Code was the
perception that manufactured housing was more vulnerable to fires than site-built
homes. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5401-26 (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 5401. "The Congress declares that the purposes of this chapter are
to reduce the number of personal injuries and deaths and the amount of insurance costs
and property damage resulting from manufactured home accidents and to improve the
quality and durability of manufactured homes." Id.
12. See 2 A. RATHKOPF & D. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING
§ 19.03 n. 1 (rev. ed. 1988); D. KMIEC, ZONING AND PLANNING DESKBOOK § 5.04[3]
(rev. ed. 1988).
13. NUTr-POWELL, supra note 8, at 25. For example, HUD researchers predicted
that a manufactured home not in compliance with HUD standards would degrade 2.8%
after travelling 487 miles. A manufactured home in compliance with HUD standards
only degraded a predicted .70%. Id.
1990]
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guidelines extend the manufactured home's useful life to thirty years.14
The HUD Code similarly reduces the effect that wind 5 and tempera-
ture16 have upon the durability and safety of mobile homes.
The HUD Code alleviates the concern about fires by eliminating the
use of aluminum electrical wiring,17 a frequent cause of mobile home
fires.' 8 The HUD Code also requires smoke alarms, fire-resistant
materials, and structural modifications designed to diminish the inci-
dence and severity of fires. Statistics reveal that manufactured homes,
complying with HUD Code standards, have fever fires and fire fatali-
ties per home than site-built homes.19
Under the guise of the police power, municipalities cite the unaes-
thetic appearance of manufactured housing as another reason for
exclusion.2" But this prejudice, based upon the presumption of physi-
cal inferiority, is erroneous.2' Courts have held that manufactured
homes are often indistinguishable from conventional homes.22
14. Id. at 24-25.
15. Manufactured homes built to HUD Code standards probably perform better
under severe wind conditions, depending upon whether the manufactured homes have
permanent foundations or wind-stabilization systems. Id. at 30-35.
16. Id. at 35-37. For instance, the HUD Code limits the amount of chimney flue
heat loss to 25%. Id. at 35.
17. Id. at 27.
18. Id. at 26. Electrical fires are the second most common type of fire in manufac-
tured homes. Id.
19. Id. at 26. In 1980, studies show that between 1976 and 1978, manufactured
homes encountered 378.9 fire incidents and 3.44 fatalities per 100,000 homes. Site-built
homes encountered 534.5 fire incidents and 4.20 fatalities per 100,000 homes. Id.
20. Bourgeois v. St. Tammany, 628 F. Supp. 159, 161 (E.D. La. 1986) (police power
covers aesthetic as well as health and safety concerns); State ex reL Wilkerson v. Mur-
ray, 471 S.W.2d 460, 463 (Mo.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971) (impossible to sepa-
rate aesthetic reasons from health and safety considerations); Town of Chesterfield v.
Brooks, 126 N.H. 64, 69, 489 A.2d 600, 604 (1985) (aesthetic values are a proper con-
sideration for New Hampshire towns when passing zoning regulations). But see In re
Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 244, 263 A.2d 395, 398 (1970) (protecting the aesthetic nature of the
municipality is not sufficient justification for exclusionary zoning); City of Milford v.
Schmidt, 175 Neb. 12, 19, 120 N.W.2d 262, 266 (1963) (exercise of police power cannot
be invoked on purely aesthetic grounds).
21. Robinson Township v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 316, 302 N.W.2d 146, 152 (1981).
22. See id. at 313, 302 N.W.2d at 150 (the mobile home today compares favorably
with site-built housing in attractiveness); Gates v. Howell, 204 Neb. 256, 263, 282
N.W.2d 22, 26 (1979) (unable to distinguish mobile homes from any other residence
unless previously advised); Koester v. Hunterdon County Board of Taxation, 79 N.J.
381, 388, 399 A.2d 656, 659 (1979) (mobile homes are being constructed to look like
conventional homes); Yeager v. Cassidy, 20 Ohio Misc. 251, 256, 253 N.E.2d 320, 323
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Legislatures advance other rationales to support the discriminatory
ordinances. Traditionally, the transience associated with manufactured
home owners has created negative attitudes about owners of manufac-
tured homes.23 However, the stationary quality of today's manufac-
tured home contradicts this stereotype. One source estimates that due
to complications in moving a manufactured home,24 sixty-nine percent
of manufactured homes are never moved after their initial siting and an
additional nineteen percent are moved only once.25 Other experts as-
sert that ninety-seven percent of manufactured homes never move after
their initial siting.26
Taxation presents another area of unequal treatment. In the past,
mobile homes failed to generate comparable tax revenues in relation to
site-built homes because cities classified mobile homes as personal
property rather than real property.27 In addition to generating less
revenue, mobile homes require greater municipal services than site-
built homes because of the higher densities in mobile home locations.28
Currently, however, most states have updated their tax laws to treat
manufactured housing as realty, especially when the home is "affixed"
to the land.29
Finally, legislatures base zoning restrictions on the declining prop-
(1969) (mobile homes may be more attractive in appearance and design than conven-
tional homes).
23. 2 R. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 14.01, at 666 (1986).
"[T]he regulation of mobile homes... has been influenced by a stereotype which de-
picts a mobile home court as a gypsy camp which shelters a breed of drifter with neither
pride nor interest in the community." Id.
24. RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 12, at § 19.03. Purchasing a lot, installing
utility lines and sewage drains, attaching to a foundation, and removing mobility equip-
ment are difficulties in moving manufactured homes. Id.
25. Id. at § 19.03 n.7.
26. Many jurisdictions are slowly realizing that 97% of "mobile" homes are placed
on sites permanently. KMIEC, supra note 12, at § 5.04[3]. See also NUT-POWELL,
supra note 8, at 3 n.2.
27. R. Bartke & H. Gage, Mobile Homes: Zoning and Taxation, 55 CORNELL L.
REv. 491, 519-20 (1970). Antiquated legislation still treats mobile homes as vehicles for
taxation purposes.
28. See, eg., Horizon Concepts v. City of Balch Springs, 789 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th
Cir. 1986) (court upheld an ordinance which recited that manufactured home develop-
ers can "build out" an area, placing a greater burden on cities providing proper
facilities).
29. KMIEC, supra note 12, at § 5.04[3]. Only Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New
Mexico treat all manufactured homes as personalty for tax purposes. Id.
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erty values caused by the presence of manufactured housing.3" The
public's negative attitude about manufactured homes causes the de-
crease in property values.3" Manufactured housing has improved be-
yond these outdated perceptions, but the public, legislatures, and
judges have failed to take notice.32 An increased awareness of the posi-
tive aspects of today's manufactured housing and its availability as an
untapped solution to the housing problem would eliminate these biases.
The primary attraction of manufactured housing is its af-
fordability.33 The President's Commission on Housing recommended
manufactured homes as a significant source of affordable housing in
contrast to the sharply rising costs of site-built housing.34 The Com-
mission attributed an increase in the market demand for manufactured
housing to improvements in the product and low prices.3 5
Unfortunately, the low cost of manufactured homes perpetuates the
society's bias against them because they are primarily marketed to peo-
ple with low or moderate income. Without recognizing the recent
changes in manufactured housing, government officials manipulate
zoning ordinances to confine manufactured homes and their owners to
out-of-sight areas.36 This discrimination manifests itself through the
exclusion of manufactured home owners from cities. 37
30. Cooper v. Sinclair, 66 So. 2d 702, 705 (Fla.), cert denied, 346 U.S. 867, 74 S. Ct.
107, 98 L. Ed. 377 (1953) (zoning ordinance designed to conserve the value of build-
ings); Colby v. Hurtt, 212 Kan. 113, 116, 509 P.2d 1142, 1145 (1973) (police power
includes conserving the value of property); Town of Manchester v. Phillips, 343 Mass.
591, 595, 180 N.E.2d 333,336 (1962) (town may reasonably consider that mobile homes
are detrimental to adjacent property values); State v. Larson, 292 Minn. 350, 357, 195
N.W.2d 180, 184 (1972) (a primary reason municipalities segregate mobile homes is loss
of property values to neighboring conventional homes); State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Mur-
ray, 471 S.W.2d 460, 462 (Mo.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971) (indiscriminate loca-
tion of mobile homes undermines conservation of property values).
31. Robinson Township v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 328, 302 N.W.2d 146, 157 (1981)
(Coleman, C.J., dissenting). The perception of manufactured homes as different from
conventional homes, whether valid or not, can have a significant effect on property
values.
32. See supra notes 7-26 and accompanying text.
33. See supra notes 1-2.
34. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON HOUSING 85 (1982).
35. Id. at 203.
36. 0. Delogn, Local Land Use Controls: An Idea Whose Time has Passed, 36 ME.
L. REV. 261, 282 (1984). Local legislatures base many ordinances on a hidden agenda,
including economic segregation and exclusion. Id.
37. Note, Restrictive Zoning of Mobile Homes: The Mobile Home is Still More "Mo-
bile" Than "Home" Under the Law, 21 IDAHO L. REv. 141 (1985).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed this type of economic ex-
clusion in Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt.
Laurel (Mt. Laurel 1)38 and Southern Burlington County N.A.A. CP v.
Township of Mt. Laurel (Mt. Laurel II).3" In these cases, lower-income
citizens attacked the Mt. Laurel land use system on the ground that the
municipality unlawfully excluded low and moderate income families.'
The court first stated that a zoning ordinance is unconstitutional unless
it provides the opportunity for a fair share of the region's need for low
and moderate income housing.4 To accomplish this goal, the court
required New Jersey municipalities to take affirmative action in provid-
ing realistic housing opportunities.42 Noting that manufactured homes
are significantly less expensive than site-built housing,43 the court held
that municipalities must provide zoning for low-cost manufactured
homes if they could not otherwise provide for sufficiently affordable
housing." Citing the technological advances in mobile homes,45 the
court overturned a New Jersey case' which upheld an absolute ban on
mobile homes.47
PART II: JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF ORDINANCES
Local ordinances often confine manufactured homes to mobile home
parks.4" Others ban manufactured homes from single-family residen-
It is undoubtedly an easy matter for the nation's elite to decide for the less affluent
that they simply should not live in mobile homes... The elite see no appreciable
difference between the trailer house of yesterday and the prefabricated homes of
today which are, of course, necessarily mobile until they arrive at their destination.
Although times have changed, and mobile homes can no longer be equated with
trailer houses, the elite do not change.
Id. at 157 (quoting City of Lewiston v. Knieriem, No. 13792, slip op. at 12 (Idaho May
12, 1983) (Bistline, J., dissenting)).
38. 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 (1975).
39. 92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983).
40. Mt. Laurel I, 67 N.J. at 158, 336 A.2d at 716.
41. Mt. Laurel 1, 67 N.J. at 187, 336 A.2d at 731-732.
42. Mt. Laurel I1, 92 N.J. at 261, 456 A.2d at 442.
43. Id. at 274-275, 456 A.2d at 450.
44. Id. at 275, 456 A.2d at 450.
45. Id.
46. Vickers v. Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962).
47. However, the court gave municipalities the discretion to regulate or even ex-
clude mobile homes depending upon the facts. Mt LaurelI, 92 N.J. at 276, 456 A.2d at
450.
48. Courts have upheld ordinances which confine manufactured homes to mobile
1990]
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tial areas,4 9 while some ordinances exclude manufactured homes from
the municipality altogether." The Supreme Court articulated consti-
tutional guidelines for zoning ordinances in Village of Euclid v. Amber
Realty.51 The Court stated that a zoning ordinance is unconstitutional
if it is arbitrary and unreasonable, and offers no substantial relation to
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. 2 Secondly, the
Court gave local and state regulations a presumption of validity. 3
Consequently, the party attacking the ordinance carries the heavy bur-
den of proving the ordinance is not related to the public health, safety,
or welfare. 4 Thus, zoning ordinances often survive constitutional
challenges.55 Exclusionary ordinances preclude manufactured homes
home parks. See, eg., Board of County Comm'rs, v. Mountain Air Ranch, 132 Colo.
364, 563 P.2d 341 (1977); Cooper v. Sinclair, 66 So. 2d 702 (Fla.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
867 (1953); City of Lewiston v. Knieriem, 107 Idaho 80, 685 P.2d 821 (1984); Village of
Matherville v. Brown, 34 M1. App. 3d 298, 339 N.E.2d 346 (1975); Colby v. Hurtt, 212
Kan. 113, 509 P.2d 1142 (1973); Warren v. Municipal Officers of Gorham, 431 A.2d
642 (Me. 1981); Town of Granby v. Landry, 341 Mass. 443, 170 N.E.2d 364 (1960);
State v. Larson, 292 Minn. 350, 195 N.W.2d 180 (1972); State ex reL Wilkerson v.
Murray, 471 S.W.2d 460 (Mo.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971); Riverview Park, Inc.
v. Town of Hinsdale, 113 N.H. 693, 313 A.2d 733 (1973); Napierkowski v. Township of
Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959); People v. Clute, 18 N.Y.2d 999, 224
N.E.2d 734, 278 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1966); Clackamas County v. Ague, 27 Or. App. 515,
556 P.2d 1386 (1976); State v. Albro, 102 R.I. 410, 231 A.2d 1 (1967); Mobile Home
City v. Hamilton County, 552 S.W.2d 86 (Tenn. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 956(1977); City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex. 1982); Duckworth
v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978). See also RATHKOPF &
RATHKOPF, supra note 12, at § 19.04 (most common method municipalities use to ex-
clude manufactured homes from single family residences is to confine them to parks).
49. Common methods involve defining "dwelling" so as to exclude manufactured
homes or by imposing size standards. RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 12, at
§ 19.04.
50. ANDERSON, supra note 22, at § 14.04,. Only two of forty-four municipalities in
Westchester County, New York, permit manufactured homes within the municipality.
51. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
52. Id. at 395.
53. Id. at 388. Legislative judgment controls on a debatable issue.
54. See City of Brookside v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 792-93 (Tex. 1982). The
party challenging the ordinance bears an extraordinary burden to show that no conclu-
sive or even controversial reason exists which would authorize the municipality's pas-
sage of the ordinance.
55. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Mobile, 245 Ala. 80, 16 So. 2d 1 (1943); Cooper v.
Sinclair, 66 So. 2d 702 (Fla.), cert denied, 346 U.S. 867 (1953); Village of Matherville v.
Brown, 34 Ill. App. 3d 298, 339 N.E.2d 346 (1975); City of Colby v. Hurtt, 212 Kan.
113, 509 P.2d 1142 (1973); Warren v. Municipal Officers of Gorham, 431 A.2d 624
(Me. 1981); Wright v. Michaud, 160 Me. 164, 200 A.2d 543 (1964); Town of Granby v.
Landry, 341 Mass. 443, 170 N.E.2d 364 (1960); Courtland Township v. Cole, 66 Mich.
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from locating anywhere within the municipality.56 Courts examine ex-
clusionary ordinances more carefully than other types of manufactured
housing regulations.57 The courts often invalidate exclusionary ordi-
nances because manufactured homes provide a source for affordable
housing" or manufactured homes represent a legitimate use of the
land.59 Courts occasionally strike down legislation that limits manu-
factured homes to unreasonably small areas of land.o
Notwithstanding the strict treatment of exclusionary ordinances,
most courts uphold other types of regulations,61 justifying the deci-
App. 474, 239 N.W.2d 630 (1976); State v. Larson, 292 Minn. 350, 195 N.W.2d 180
(1972); State ex reL Wilkerson v. Murray, 471 S.W.2d 460 (Mo.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
851 (1971); Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481
(1959); People v. Clute, 47 Misc. 2d 1005, 263 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d
999, 224 N.E.2d 734, 278 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1966); Mobile Home City of Chattanooga v.
Hamilton County, 552 S.W.2d 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 956
(1977); City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1087 (1982); Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860
(1978); Town of Stonewood v. Bell, 270 S.E.2d 787 (W.Va. 1980).
56. See MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 1.09 (1988) (exclusionary land use con-
trols restrict lower income groups from a community).
57. See Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959);
In re Shore, 107 Pa Commw. 522, 528 A.2d 1045 (1987). But see Village of Columbiana
v. Keister, 5 Ohio App. 3d 81, 449 N.E.2d 465 (1981) (court upheld ordinance banning
manufactured homes from municipality).
58. See, eg. Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt. Laurel,
92 N.J. 158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983). See also Lakeland Bluff, Inc. v. County of Will, 114
Ill. App. 2d 267, 279, 252 N.E.2d 765, 770 (1969) (the need for lower income housing,
though not determinative, is a factor in invalidating an exclusionary ordinance).
59. Brown v. Dougherty County, 250 Ga. 658, 300 S.E.2d 509 (1983) (landowner
demonstrated a compatible use, shifting burden to municipality to justify zoning
scheme); City of Sparta v. Brenning, 45 IlL2d 359, 259 N.E.2d 30 (1970) (municipality
has no authority to prohibit absolutely the use of a trailer upon any parcel of land);
Czech v. City of Blaine, 312 Minn. 535, 253 N.W.2d 272 (1977) (denial of petition for
mobile home park use was an unconstitutional taking); Board of Supervisors of Upper
Frederick Township v. Moland Development Co., 19 Pa. Commw. 207, 339 A.2d 141
(1975) (township ban on a legitimate land use, such as trailer parks, is unconstitutional).
60. See, e-g., Environmental Communities of Pennsylvania v. North Coventry
Township, 49 Pa. Commw. 167, 412 A.2d 650, (1980) (ordinance restricting manufac-
tured home use to 1.5% of the municipality's land is exclusionary and invalid); Nickola
v. Township of Grand Blanc, 394 Mich. 589, 232 N.W.2d 604 (1975) (allotting one-
tenth of one percent of municipality for manufactured home use is exclusionary and
invalid).
61. Courts have upheld nonexclusionary yet restrictive zoning ordinances. See, e.g.,
Davis v. City of Mobile, 245 Ala. 80, 16 So. 2d 1 (1943); Cooper v. Sinclair, 66 So. 2d
702 (Fla.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 867 (1953); Village of Matherville v. Brown, 34 Ill.
App. 3d 298, 339 N.E.2d 346 (1975); City of Colby v. Hurtt, 212 Kan. 113, 509 P.2d
1990]
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sions by relying on unfounded prejudices. In City ofLewiston v. Knier-
iem 62 the court stated the prevailing view that mobile homes warrant
separate regulation from other dwellings and thus can be confined to
mobile home parks or excluded from resideptial districts.63 Relying
upon the ordinance's presumption of validity," the preservation of
property values, and general safety and welfare considerations,65 the
court upheld the ordinance regulating manufactured home location.66
In City of Brookside Village v. Comeau67 the Texas Supreme Court
found a valid exercise of the municipality's police power 61 when it re-
viewed an ordinance which permitted manufactured housing only in
mobile home parks.69 The court relied upon a Georgia decision hold-
ing that mobile homes present special health and safety problems.7"
The court insisted that any similarities between manufactured homes
and site-built homes were insufficient to overcome the ordinance's pre-
sumption of validity.7 1
Some courts have recognized the advancements and benefits of man-
ufactured housing and have restrained municipalities from enforcing
discriminatory manufactured housing regulations. Robinson Township
v. Knoll72 is the landmark decision exemplifying this new direction.
1142 (1973); Warren v. Municipal Officers of Gorham, 431 A.2d 624 (Me. 1981);
Wright v. Michaud, 160 Me. 164, 200 A.2d 543 (1964); Town of Granby v. Landry, 341
Mass. 443, 170 N.E.2d 364 (1960); Courtland Township v. Cole, 66 Mich. App. 474,
239 N.W.2d 630 (1976); State v. Larson, 292 Minn. 350, 195 N.W.2d 180 (1972); State
ex rel. Wilkerson v. Murray, 471 S.W.2d 460 (Mo.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 851 (1971);
Napierkowski v. Township of Gloucester, 29 N.J. 481, 150 A.2d 481 (1959); People v.
Clute, 47 Misc. 2d 1005, 263 N.Y.S.2d 826 (1965), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 999, 224 N.E.2d
734, 278 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1966); Mobile Home City of Chattanooga v. Hamilton County,
552 S.W.2d 86 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 956 (1977); City of Brook-
side Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982);
Duckworth v. City of Bonney Lake, 91 Wash. 2d 19, 586 P.2d 860 (1978); Town of
Stonewood v. Bell, 270 S.E.2d 787 (W.Va. 1980).
62. 107 Idaho 80, 685 P.2d 821 (1984)
63. Id. at 83, 685 P.2d at 824.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 84, 685 P.2d at 824-825.
66. Id. at 84, 685 P.2d at 825.
67. 633 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982).
68. Id. at 792.
69. Id at 793 (citing BROOKSIDE VILLAGE ORDINANCE 78 (1974)).
70. Id. at 794 (citing Nichols v. Pirkle, 202 Ga. 372, 43 S.E.2d 306 (1947)).
71. Id. at 795. The court notes that if manufactured homes are technologically
equal to site-built homes, the legislature should act rather than the judiciary. Id.
72. 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981).
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Robinson Township, a Michigan city, invoked a local ordinance 73 to
remove the Knoll's manufactured home from the residential district.
The Robinson court overturned Township of Wyoming v. Herweyer,74
which had upheld a statute confining mobile homes to mobile home
parks. The Robinson court held that the per se exclusion of manufac-
tured homes from areas not designated as mobile home parks had no
reasonable basis under the police power, and was therefore unconstitu-
tional.75 The Robinson court found that distinctions between manufac-
tured homes and site-built homes are nonexistent due to improvements
in the size, quality, and appearance of mobile homes.7 6 Consequently,
the court held that the discriminatory ordinance had no reasonable ba-
sis to the township's police power.77
Despite its broad holding, the Robinson court allows municipalities
the freedom to exclude manufactured homes from residential areas.7 8
Municipalities may still regulate the size, appearance, quality of manu-
facturing, or the manner of on-site installation, so long as the exclu-
sions are based on reasonable standards designed to assure favorable
comparison of manufactured homes with site-built homes.79 This un-
dercuts Robinson's advocacy of equality by allowing Michigan munici-
palities to treat manufactured homes differently. In addition, this
loophole substantially diminishes the persuasiveness and precedential
value of the Robinson principles.
As a consequence, subsequent Michigan decisions ° have upheld or-
73. ROBINSON TOWNSHIP ZONING ORDINANCE § 307.1 provides:
Mobile Homes Where Permitted: Mobile homes are considered as dwelling units an
dare not permitted as an accessory use to a permitted principle use and are permit-
ted only in approved mobile home parks.
Id. at 308 n.2, 302 N.W.2d at 148 n.2.
74. 321 Mich. 611, 33 N.W.2d 93 (1948).
75. Robinson, 410 Mich. at 310, 302 N.W.2d at 149.
76. Id. Contra Clark v. County of Winnebago, 817 F.2d 407, 409 (7th Cir. 1987);
Grant v. County of Seminole, 817 F.2d 731, 736 (1 lth Cir. 1987); Cirrituck County v.
Willey, 266 S.E.2d 52, 53 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980).
77. Robinson, 410 Mich. at 310, 302 N.W.2d at 149.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Some courts have avoided the Robinson precedent and upheld ordinances regu-
lating manufactured housing locations. Gackler Land Co. v. Yankee Springs Town-
ship, 427 Mich. 562, 398 N.W.2d (1986); Howard Township Board of Trustees v.
Waldo, 168 Mich. App. 565, 425 N.W.2d 180 (1988); Pauter v. Comstock Charter
Township, 163 Mich. App. 670, 415 N.W. 232 (1987); Bunker Hill Township v. Good-
noe, 125 Mich.App. 794, 337 N.W.2d 27 (1983).
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dinances which confine manufactured homes to mobile home parks. In
Gackler Land Co. v. Yankee Springs Township81 an owner of a manu-
factured home challenged an ordinance which permitted any "dwell-
ing" in residential areas. The regulation defined "dwelling" by stating
minimum size standards, effectively excluding single-wide manufac-
tured homes."2 The Michigan Supreme Court found that the standards
applied to all homes and did not treat manufactured homes as though
they were materially different from site-built homes.83 Secondly, the
Gackler court held that the size standards attempted to assure
favorable comparisons of manufactured homes with site-built homes.84
Other Michigan courts applying the same reasoning, have also upheld
discriminatory ordinances.8 5
Other state courts have relied on Robinson to strike down restrictive
legislation of mobile homes. In Luczynski v. Temple 8 6 the court, citing
Robinson, recognized the superiority of today's manufactured home
over the trailers of thirty years ago.87 The court noted that manufac-
tured homes are an inexpensive, safe, and aesthetically acceptable alter-
native to site-built housing.88 The court declared unconstitutional a
statute restricting manufactured homes to mobile home parks.89 The
court also adopted the Robinson qualification regarding equal treat-
ment of manufactured homes. The court stated that New Jersey mu-
nicipalities can legitimately exclude manufactured homes from an area
so long as the standards in municipal ordinances are designed to assure
that manufactured homes will compare favorably with other housing.90
81. 427 Mich. 562, 398 N.W.2d 393 (1983).
82. Id. at 569, 398 N.W.2d at 395. The ordinance defined "dwelling" as follows:
"1. It complies with the minimum square footage requirements [720 square feet]. 2. It
has a minimum width along any exterior side elevation of 24 feet and a minimum inter-
nal height of seven and one-half feet." Id. at 568, 398 N.W.2d at 395.
83. Id. at 570, 398 N.W.2d at 396.
84. Id
85. See supra note 80; Tyrone v. Crouch, 426 Mich. 642, 397 N.W.2d 166 (1986)
(affirming the invalidity of an ordinance applying dimension standards only to manufac-
tured homes).
86. 203 N.J. Super. 377, 497 A.2d 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985). See also
Bourgeois v. St. Tammany, 628 F. Supp. 159, 163 (E.D.La. 1986) (some mobile homes
are not inferior to site-built homes).
87. Lucynski at 383, 497 A.2d at 214.
88. Id. at 384, 497 A.2d at 215.
89. Id.
90. Id.
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PART III: THE NECESSITY OF STATE ACTION
As previously discussed, local legislatures and courts have failed to
accommodate the modem manufactured home despite improvements
in manufacture, their lower cost and the need for affordable housing.
The most effective and immediate remedy is for states to enact progres-
sive enabling legislation regarding manufactured home use. Housing is
no longer merely a local issue.91 The President's Report,92 which ad-
vocates local housing deregulation, declares that states appear increas-
ingly prepared to preempt local authority by using manufactured
housing to solve the housing-cost problem.9 3 Because Euclid protects
these ordinances with a strong presumption of validity, courts also sug-
gest that state legislatures respond to the problem.9 4
States should bear the burden of correcting local ordinances, because
municipal zoning legislation depends upon the state.95 Local govern-
ments are not independent or sovereign. Local government's power to
enact zoning ordinances derives from the state's police power, through
state enabling statutes.96 A local government's zoning measure is valid
only if it falls within the purpose of the state's enabling legislation.97
91. PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 34, at 237. See also M. Sellman, Equal Treat-
ment of Housing: A Proposed Model State Code for Manufactured Housing, 20 URB.
LAW. 73, 74 (1988) (housing is more than a local issue as states reassert their role in
local land use planning).
92. PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 34.
93. Id. at 236. See also 0. Delogu, The Misuse of Land Use Control Powers Must
End: Suggestions for Legislative and Judicial Responses, 32 ME. L. REv. 29, 32 (1980)
(state legislatures need to develop inclusionary mechanisms designed to curtail munici-
pal inclinations to exclude).
94. See City of Lewiston v. Knieriem, 107 Idaho 80, 84 n.3, 685 P.2d 821, 825 n.3
(1984); Warren v. Municipal Officers of Gorham, 431 A.2d 624, 630 (Me. 1981); Mobile
Home City of Chatanooga v. Hamilton County, 552, S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1977); City of Brookside Village v. Comeau, 33 S.W.2d 790, 795 (Tex. 1982) (courts
deferred to the legislature the power to eliminate location restrictions in manufactured
housing zoning ordinances).
95. Delogu, supra note 93, at 30 (local governments do not exist to legislate local
wishes, aspirations, mores, biases, conceptions of the good life, aesthetic values, or polit-
ical predilections as they are possessed of limited jurisdiction and powers). See also
Luczynski v. Temple, 203 N.J. Super. 377, 381, 497 A.2d 211, 213 (1985).
96. 1988 ZONING AND PLANNING LAW HANDBOOK § 3.04(1) (N. Gordon ed.
1988) (states delegate police power, including the power to zone, in two ways: home
rule power and enabling statutes).
97. Id. at 105.
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Because states grant the power, they can impose limitations on it.98
Consequently, state legislatures can apply various degrees of influence
upon decision-makers.
An American Planning Association report reveals that local govern-
ments follow a state legislature's lead in enacting progressive zoning
ordinances.99 The 1985 report revealed that sixty percent of the 121
communities that permit manufactured housing in residential districts
are located in states which have passed legislation that prohibits the
exclusion of manufactured homes built in compliance with the HUD
Code.1°°
State legislatures should also inject simplicity and uniformity into
local zoning schemes. The complexity of current local regulations cre-
ates unnecessary costs.101 Excessive regulations account for up to
twenty-five percent of the total cost of a home. 02 As one commentator
observes, simplified state regulation would liberate developers,
homebuilders and homeowners from "potential pitfalls, risks, or uncer-
tainties inherent in the development gauntlet and regulatory maze that
local governments have fashioned under the rubric of police
powers." 10
3
Currently, state legislatures have handled this issue inadequately.
98. Delogu, supra note 93, at 30 (local governments are creatures of the state, analo-
gous to state agencies).
99. See W. SANDERS, REGULATING MANUFACTURED HOUSING, AMERICAN
PLANNING ASSOCIATION, PAS Report No. 398, at 4 (1986).
100. Id.
101. Sellman, supra note 91, at 77 n.18.
In the field of housing regulations, government intervention was responsible for
increasing costs. In some cases it was clear that the magnitude of these cost
increases was relatively small, while in other cases it was apparent that a significant
increase was created. Although some circumstances or necessity justified the pas-
sage of such government regulations, it was the inefficiencies of the administrative
processes and sometimes the misuse of its power for illegitimate ends which was
responsible for inflating costs.
Id. (quoting S. SEIDEL, HOUSING COSTS AND GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS: CON-
FRONTING THE REGULATORY MAZE 304 (1978)). See PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra
note 34, at 178. (regulations which often exclude low income families unnecessarily
increase housing costs).
102. KMIEC, supra note 12, at § 2.06 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN
DEVELOPMENT, THE PRESIDENT'S NATIONAL URBAN POLICY REPORT 64 (1984)).
For example, growth controls in California account for 27% of the increase in real
housing costs between 1972 and 1979. A similar situation occurred in Boulder, Colo-
rado. Id.
103. Selman, supra note 91, at 79.
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Less than a third of the states have addressed exclusionary treatment of
manufactured housing. 1°4 Fewer states enforce equal statutory treat-
ment of site-built homes and manufactured homes.105 Vermont is the
most progressive state in ensuring equality. Its statute provides that
"no zoning regulation shall have the effect of excluding mobile homes,
modular housing, or other forms of prefabricated housing from the
municipality, except upon the same terms and conditions as conven-
tional housing is excluded.""' Iowa and Minnesota require equal
treatment of manufactured homes and conventional homes.107 How-
ever, these latter ordinances have loopholes which the Vermont statute
avoids. 108
104. See generally CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65852.3 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 30-28-115 (1986); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 553.35 (West 1972 & Supp. 1987); IND. CODE
§ 36-7-4-1106 (Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 414.28 & 358A.30 (West 1976 &
Supp. 1986); KAN. STATE. ANN. § 19-2938 (1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit.30,
§ 4965 (West 1973 & Supp. 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 394.25 (West 1968 & Supp.
1989); NEB. STAT. ANN. § 15-902 (1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN § 674:32 (1986 &
Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN § 40:55D-100 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 3-21A-3(2)(A) (1978); OR. REv. STAT. § 197.295 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 13-24-201 (1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4406(4)(A) (1975 & Supp. 1989); 1986
MICH. PUB. AcTs 299.
105. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 414.28 & 358A.30 (West 1976 & Supp. 1986); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 394.25 (West 1968 & Supp. 1989); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24,
§ 4406(4)(A)(1975 & Supp. 1989).
106. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4406 (4) (1975 & Supp. 1989). See also RATHKOPF
& RATHKOPF, supra note 12, at § 19.06 n.2 (the statute's policy is further strengthened
by the Vermont Agency of Development and Community Affairs; the agency inter-
preted the statute to require the elimination of all distinctions between housing based
solely on methods of construction).
107. IOWA CODE ANN. § 358A.30 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989); IOWA CODE ANN
414.28 (West 1976 & Supp. 1989) prohibits cities and counties from enacting:
zoning regulations or other ordinances which disallow the plans and specifications
of a proposed residential structure solely because the proposed structure is a manu-
factured home. Moreover, a zoning ordinance or regulation shall require that a
manufactured home be located and installed according to the same standards, in-
cluding but not limited to, a foundation system, set-back, and minimum square
footage which would apply to a site-built, single family dwelling on the same lot.
Id.
The Minnesota legislature enacted MINN. STAT. ANN § 462.357(1) (West 1963 &
Supp. 1989) which provides that "no regulation may prohibit ... manufactured housing
built in conformance with [the HUD Code] that comply with all other zoning ordi-
nances promulgated to this section."
108. See Sellman, supra note 91, at 84-85. Iowa's statutory provisions allow private
restrictions on manufactured housing locations to remain intact. Secondly, the Iowa
provisions only apply to permanently-sited manufactured homes. Id. MINN. STAT.
ANN § 462.357(1) (West 1963 & Supp. 1989) permits local governments to impose their
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In other states, the state legislature may explicitly prohibit manufac-
tured home discrimination, yet allow local governments the freedom to
impose their own zoning standards and requirements. For example,
California legislation asserts that "no city ... shall ... prohibit the
installation of mobile homes certified under the [HUD Code] on a
foundation system on lots zoned for single-family dwellings."" De-
spite the broad language purporting equality, cities can designate cer-
tain lots for manufactured homes in areas zoned for single family
residences and can impose setback, yard, access, parking, aesthetic,
minimum square footage, roofing, and siding standards." °
The remainder of the state enabling statutes fall within the range of
the Vermont and California statutes. I" Most existing state legislation
falls within several categories. The statutes either specify that manu-
factured homes must be allowed in all single-family residential areas, 112
allowed in some residential areas, 113 or merely prohibited com-
pletely. 14 The common element in the enabling statutes is that local
municipalities enjoy various degrees of freedom to exercise their biases
against manufactured housing."' One example is a New Hampshire
own standards provided the regulations are uniform for each class of buildings, but the
regulations in one district may differ from those in other districts.
109. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65852.3 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989).
110. Id.
Ill. See, e.g., INDIANA CODE § 36-7-4-1106 (Supp. 1987). The Indiana statute in-
structs municipal legislatures to subject all dwelling units, including manufactured
homes, to the same standards and requirements. Indiana allows municipalities to im-
pose aesthetic and structural regulation, although § 36-7-4-1106(b) limits aesthetic and
structural standards to roofing and siding features. The Indiana code also provides that
municipalities "may not totally preclude all [double-width] manufactured homes...
from being installed as permanent residences on any lot on which any other type of
dwelling unit may be placed. Id
112. RATnKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 12, at § 19.06 n.3. Rathkopf lists Colo-
rado, Iowa, Maine, New Jersey, and South Dakota as states which employ this type of
regulation. Id.
113. The Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Minnesota, Oregon, New Hampshire, and
New Mexico statutes impose this type of regulation. Id. at § 19.06 n.4.
114. The Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, Tennessee, and Virginia statutes fall within
this category. Id. at § 19.06 n.5.
115. Sellman, supra note 91, at 86-97. The author thoroughly discusses the state
laws regulating manufactured housing. Colorado: COLO. REv. STAT. § 30-28-115 (1986)
permits local governments to enact:
any zoning, developmental, use, aesthetic, or historical standard, including, but not
limited to, requirements relating to permanent foundations, minimum floor space,
unit size or sectional requirements, and improvement location, side yard, and set-
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statute116 which bars municipalities from totally excluding manufac-
tured housing. The statute, however, provides that "[a] municipality
which adopts land use control measures shall allow, in its sole discre-
tion, manufactured housing to be located on individual lots in some,
back standards to the extent that such standards or requirements are applicable to
existing or new housing within the specific use district of the county.
Id. at (3)(b)(II). Florida: Florida's Department of Community Affairs gives broad pow-
ers to local legislatures. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 553.38 (West 1972 & Supp. 1986) provides
that "local land use and zoning requirements, fire zones, building setback requirements,
side and rear yard requirements, site development requirements, property line require-
ments, subdivision control, and onsite installation requirement, as well as review and
regulation of architectural and aesthetic requirements, are specifically and entirely re-
served to local authorities. " Id. at § 553.38(2). See also RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF,
supra note 12, at § 19.06 n.4 (concluding that the Florida statute is definitionally restric-
tive since "manufactured building" does not include mobile homes built to HUD Code
standards). Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19-2938 (1981) prohibits the "arbitrary exclu-
sion" of manufactured housing by a municipality. The statute does not attempt to limit
local municipality's freedom nor encourage the use of inclusionary zoning. Local gov-
ernments exclude manufactured housing as they see fit, simply by manipulating the
definition of "arbitrary exclusion." Maine: The Maine statute, ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 30, § 4965.2 (West 1973 & Supp. 1986), allows local governments to establish design
criteria, including roof design and the use of exterior siding in an effort to appear "resi-
dential." Michigan: 1986 MICH. PUB. AcTS 299, § 7(6) of Act No. 419 of the Public
Acts of 1976 grants to local legislatures the power to impose reasonable standards on
manufactured housing to ensure that they compare favorably to site-built housing, ex-
posing manufactured housing to local government discretion. Michigan's statute is es-
pecially disappointing in light of Robinson Township. See supra note 72. Nebraska:
NEn. REV. STAT. § 15 - 902 (1983) provides that a municipality's
zoning regulations shall be designed to secure safety from fire, flood, and other
dangers and to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare, and shall be
made with consideration having been given to the character of the various parts of
the area zoned and their peculiar suitability for particular uses and types of devel-
opment, and with a view to conserving property values and encouraging the most
appropriate use of land throughout the area zoned, in accordance with a compre-
hensive plan.
Id. This clause gives local authorities discretion to impose their own restrictive ordi-
nances. New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:55D-104 (West 1983 & Supp. 1986) applies
its pro-manufactured home provisions only to manufactured homes over twenty-two
feet in width. Thus, local municipalities can effectively confine single-width manufac-
tured homes to mobile home parks. Oregon: OR. REv. STAT. § 197.307(4) (a-c) allows
municipalities to set approval standards under which a particular housing type is per-
mitted outright, to impose special conditions upon approval of a specific development or
to establish approval procedures. Tennessee: Like the New Jersey statute, TENN. STAT.
ANN. § 13-24 201 (Supp. 1986) applies its equality provisions to only double-wide man-
ufactured homes. § 13-24-202 provides that manufactured residential dwellings shall
have the same general appearance as required for site-built homes.
116. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 674.32 (1986).
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but not necessarily all, residential areas." '117 Thus, in Town of Chester-
field v. Brooks,"' a manufactured home owner challenged a municipal
ordinance 19 which prohibited him from locating a manufactured
home on his own land. The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld
the ordinance by stating it was in compliance with the state statute.1 2
PART IV: THE STATE CODE PROVISIONS
The proposed state code must send an assertive, unambiguous signal
to municipalities that discriminatory measures against mobile homes
are invalid. State legislatures can implement the provisions through a
state enabling act121 or the provisions can form the basis for separate
legislation.1 22 The code should illuminate recent advances in mobile
home regulation. The code must also implement specific tools to en-
sure that the policies are enforced.
First, the legislature should adopt a statute with policies and prem-
ises upon which future local ordinances can rely. The legislatures
should acknowledge the problem of finding affordable housing and rec-
ognize their duty to alleviate the problem.' 23 Following the New
Jersey Supreme Court's example in Mt. Laurel II, legislatures should
order municipalities to provide housing opportunities for low and fixed
income families.124 The code ought to specify that manufactured hous-
117. Id. The statute also imposes appearance criteria, including lot size, frontage
requirements, and space limitations. Id.
118. 126 N.H. 64, 489 A.2d 600 (1985).
119. Id. at 65, 489 A2d. at 601. (citing CHESTERFIELD, N.H. ZONING AND BUILD-
ING ORDINANCE § 413).
120. Chesterfield, 126 N.H. at 67, 489 A.2d at 602. The court, however, invalidated
the ordinance on state equal protection grounds: the ordinance applied greater set-back
requirements to manufactured homes than it did to conventional homes. Id. at 71, 489
A.2d at 605.
121. See, eg., KMIEC, supra note 12, at § 2.07(4)(a). Kmiec proposes a "Model
State Land Use Enabling Statute" designed to curtail local limitations on developmental
zoning.
122. See, eg., Sellman, supra note 91, at 99-101. The author proposes a model state
code, entitled The Affordable Housing Act, solely providing for favorable treatment of
manufactured housing. Id.
123. Id. at 99. In Sellman's The Affordable Housing Act, section I asserts that "the
Legislature finds and declares that a need for affordable housing exists for citizens and
that its citizens have a right to affordable housing." Id.
124. Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mt. Laurel (Mt. Lau-
rel I1), 92 N.J. 158, 261, 456 A.2d 390, 450 (1983). See supra notes 38-47 and accompa-
nying text.
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ing fulfills that need. 12 5 Further, the code should recognize the equal-
ity of manufactured housing and conventional housing, especially those
manufactured homes that comply with the HUD Code. 126 The code
should also recognize the recent health and safety advances in the man-
ufactured housing industry.127 These premises provide guidelines for
local ordinances and judicial review.
The main function of a progressive state code is to ensure that mu-
nicipal zoning ordinances treat conventional homes and permanently
attached manufactured homes equally. An express provision of equal-
ity or a ban on the per se exclusion of manufactured housing will deter
discrimination. For instance, the Tennessee code expressly provides
that no local government can use its zoning power to exclude the place-
ment of manufactured homes on land designated for residential use.128
As the post-Robinson Michigan cases 129 illustrate, a per se equality
statement does not eliminate the problem. Municipal ordinances,
while following the Robinson ban on per se discrimination of mobile
homes, applied minimum-space and other requirements to manufac-
tured and conventional homes that qualify as a single-family dwell-
ing.13° Several Michigan courts13 have allowed municipalities to
impose these regulations under the Robinson "reasonable standards to
assure favorable comparison" test.' 32 For instance, three ordinances
imposed minimum space and dimension requirements.1 33 Another or-
125. See, eg., Sellman, supra note 91, at 99. "The legislature has determined that
manufactured housing provides state homeowners with an affordable source of decent,
safe, and sanitary housing on a permanent basis." Id.
126. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
127. See, e.g., Sellman, supra note 91, at 99. "The legislature further finds that in
the last decade the improved design, appearance and significant technological advances
of manufactured housing built HUD Code standards, makes manufactured housing
equivalent to conventional, site-built single family dwellings.. ." Id.
128. TENN. STAT. ANN. § 13-24-201 (Supp. 1986).
129. See infra notes 131-134 and accompanying text.
130. See generally Tyrone Township v. Crouch, 426 Mich. 642, 397 N.W.2d 166
(1986) (the Michigan Supreme Court invalidated an exclusionary ordinance which ap-
plied size requirements to manufactured homes but not to conventional homes).
131. Gackler Land Co. v. Yankee Springs Township, 427 Mich. 562, 398 N.W.2d
393 (1986); Howard Township Board of Trustees v. Waldo, 168 Mich. App. 565, 425
N.W.2d 180 (1988); Pauter v. Comstock Charter Township, 163 Mich. App. 670, 415
N.W.2d 232 (1987); Bunker Hill Township v. Goodnoe, 125 Mich. App. 794, 337
N.W.2d 27 (1983).
132. Robinson Township v. Knoll, 410 Mich. 293, 302 N.W.2d 146 (1981).
133. HOWARD TOWNSHIP ZONING ORDINANCE No. 88 requires all dwellings to
have a minimum width of 24 feet and minimum first floor space of 840 square feet. 168
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dinance, upheld by the Michigan Supreme Court, 134 imposes nine cri-
teria for dwelling status, including space, dimension, and aesthetic
standards. 35 Other ordinances, using width requirements of over
fourteen feet, effectively exclude all single-width manufactured homes
from residential areas.136
Thus, an equality-of-treatment provision fails to ensure that ordi-
nances will not effectively exclude manufactured housing.137 The state
code should provide that no municipality may impose regulatory stan-
dards which have the effect of discriminating against manufactured
homes.13 The provision should parallel the Vermont statute's direc-
Mich. App. at. 569, 425 N.W.2d at 182. CoMsTocK TOWNSHIP ZONING ORDINANCE
§ 2.01.28(2) requires that all dwellings have a core living space of 20 feet by 20 feet. 163
Mich. App. at 671, 415 N.W.2d at 232-33. THE BUNKER HILL TOWNSHIP ZONING
ORDINANCE requires that all dwellings have 720 square feet and a minimum width of
14 feet. 125 Mich. App. at 795, 337 N.W.2d at 28.
134. Gackler Land Co. v. Yankee Springs Township, 427 Mich. 562, 398 N.W.2d
393 (1986).
135. Id. at 568, 398 N.W.2d at 395. The ordinance imposed the following require-
ments upon a dwelling:
1. It complies with the minimum square footage requirements [720 square
feet]....
2. It has a minimum width along any exterior side elevation of 24 feet and a
minimum internal height of seven and one-half feet.
3. It is firmly attached to a solid foundation constructed on the site in accord-
ance with the township building code, which shall be a fully enclosed basement or
crawl space....
4. It does not have exposed wheels, towing mechanisms, under carriage or
chassis.
5. The dwelling is connected to a public sewer and water supply or to such
private facilities approved by the local health department.
6. The dwelling contains storage area(s)... equal to not less than 15% of the
interior living area of the dwelling.
7. The dwelling is aesthetically compatible in design and appearance to con-
ventionally on-site constructed homes....
8. The dwelling contains no additions of rooms.., not constructed with simi-
lar materials.. .and workmanship as the original structure.
9. The dwelling complies with all pertinent building and fire codes.
Id.
136. YANKEE SPRINGS TOWNSHIP ORDINANCE, id.; HOWARD TOWNSHIP ORDI-
NANCE, supra note 133.
137. See RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 12, at § 19.04(d). "Dimensional re-
quirements such as floor area or lot size restrictions, also serve to exclude manufactured
homes from single family zones. These restrictions have been upheld if they applied
equally to conventional homes." Id.
138. See Delogu, supra note 93, at 64. The "intent-to-exclude" test is a barrier
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tive for equality. 139
Municipal planners phrase the community's real objectives in ob-
lique language that courts, presuming constitutional validity, allow
wide discretion."4 An ordinance's semantics should not determine
whether the ordinance is exclusionary. Often, courts find ordinances
constitutional simply because the ordinance applies to both manufac-
tured homes and site-built homes,"' though the ordinance may have
an exclusionary effect. 142 The state code should provide that a land-
owner can establish a presumption of invalidity by showing an ordi-
nance's effect is to exclude. 14 3
The state code should broadly define "single-family dwelling" to in-
clude forms of manufactured housing. Most current local ordinances
define "mobile homes" independently from "dwellings,"'" distinguish-
ing manufactured homes using a "mobility standard."' 4 5 This stan-
dard defines prefabricated housing by whether it is intended to be
mobile at the place of manufacture.' 4 6 In fact, most courts uphold
behind which those bent on exclusion may hide. In contrast the "effects" test is prag-
matic and deals realistically with the results of municipal actions and policies.
139. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4406(4)(A) (1975 Supp. 1989).
140. Delogu, supra note 36, at 288. Municipalities abuse their police power, acting
in accordance with populist rhetoric without good faith or respect for the constitution.
Id.
141. See, e.g., Gackler Land Co. v. Yankee Springs Township, 427 Mich. 562, 398
N.W.2d 393 (1986). Cf Town of Chesterfield v. Brooks, 126 N.H. 64, 489 A.2d 600
(1985) (application of greater setback requirements to manufactured homes but not con-
ventional homes violates state equal protection clause).
142. Gackler, 427 Mich. at 569, 398 N.W.2d at 396. The ordinance excludes all
single-width manufactured homes.
143. See Delogu, supra note 93, at 64. (if municipalities cannot rebut the presump-
tion with a convincing need or rationale, the ordinance should fail).
144. RATHKOPF & RATHKOPF, supra note 12, at § 19.04(d) n.24 (citing City of
Cordele v. Hill, 250 Ga. 628, 300 S.E.2d 161 (1983)) (an ordinance regulating mobile
homes did not apply to double-width homes which arrived at the site needing comple-
tion); Kirk v. Town of Westlake, 421 So. 2d 473 (La. App. 1982) (despite a mobile
home meeting the definition of dwelling, the court interpreted it to mean trailer); Cain
v. Powers, 100 N.M. 184, 668 P.2d 300 (1983) (mobile home generally means trailer
house for purposes of a restrictive covenant); Cripe v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Meadville,
78 Pa. Commw. 202, 467 A.2d 92 (1983) (mobile home on a permanent foundation did
not qualify as a dwelling).
145. See J. Brown & M. Sellman, Manufactured Housing: The Invalidity of the
"Mobility" Standard, 19 URB. LAW. 367 (1987).
146. Id. at 370.
Perhaps the most unjustifiable.., means of regulation has been the manipulation
of the manufactured home's delivery to its permanent site. Many statutes, ordi-
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statutes which define prefabricated homes as mobile, despite removal of
the wheels and placement on a permanent foundation.147 These sepa-
rate definitions relieve courts from determining whether a mobile home
is a dwelling or a trailer. 148
In Heath v. Parker,'49 subdivision lot owners brought an action to
enforce a restrictive covenant prohibiting "trailers" from locating in
the subdivision. The court found for the defendants, who owned a
manufactured home.' 50 The court used its own definition of trailer, as
a "vehicle designed to be hauled," in concluding that the manufactured
home was not a trailer.151 Further, the court denounced the mobility
standard, stating that the initial design of the manufactured home does
not control. 152 The court took the initiative in Heath because the cove-
nant did not originally define "trailer." Municipal ordinances, on the
other hand, define "dwelling" and "manufactured home," often label-
ling the latter as a trailer. These definitions bind the courts. 3
nances, and court decisions reflect the time-worn perception that if a dwelling is
delivered on wheels, it cannot satisfy the acceptable standards of traditional hous-
ing. The historical basis for this irrational stereotype of manufactured housing is
directly attributable to its predecessors, the 'trailer' or 'mobile' home resting on
cinder blocks ... on the outskirts of town.
Id.
147. See ANDERSON, supra note 23, at § 14.03. Courts have held that the mobile
home remains a mobile home notwithstanding removal of the wheels and placement on
a permanent foundation. Oakdale v. Benoit, 342 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 344 So. 2d 670 (1977) (placing a mobile home on concrete blocks is not sufficient
to classify it as a dwelling); Cripe v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 78 Pa. Commw. 202,467 A.2d
92 (1983) (zoning ordinance still applies to a mobile home, despite removing the wheels
and placing a mobile home on a foundation); City of Asheboro v. Auman, 26 N.C.App.
87, 214 S.E.2d 621 (1975) (removal of a mobile home's transportable equipment does
not change its essential nature); Columbia County v. Kelly, 25 Or. App. 1, 548 P.2d 163
(1976) (although mobile home does not fall under definition of mobile home once its
wheels are removed, it still falls under the exclusionary zoning regulation).
148. Id. at § 14.03. Courts have difficulty determining the extent to which a trailer
loses its character as a vehicle when it is placed upon an immobile foundation.
149. 93 N.M. 680, 604 P.2d 818 (1980).
150. Id. at 682, 604 P.2d at 820.
151. Id. at 681, 604 P.2d at 819.
152. Id. at 682, 604 P.2d at 820.
153. See Town of Helena v. Country Mobile Homes, Inc. 387 So. 2d 162 (Ala.
1980) (Court upheld an ordinance distinguishing excluded mobile homes from permit-
ted factory-built homes). But see Geiger v. Zoning Hearing Board of Township of
North Whitehall, 510 Pa. 231, 507 A.2d 361 (1986) (court invalidated an ordinance
distinguishing excluded mobile homes from permitted modular homes on the number of
sections they have).
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The new state code should abandon the mobility standard and ex-
pand the definition of dwelling to include prefabricated homes of rela-
tive permanence and built to HUD Code standards, including both
single- and double-width homes. 54 In this manner, municipalities de-
fine manufactured homes by their characteristics at the site at which
they are located, rather than by their condition prior to placement. 5
Excluding manufactured homes simply on the basis of their mode of
delivery is unreasonable where manufactured homes are substantially
the same as conventional, one-family dwellings.1 56
The state code will assist mobile home owners in judicial challenges
against ordinances.157 The legislature can direct the courts to tighten
the Euclid standard for review of municipal ordinances. 158 Rather
than the broad police power standard promoting health, safety, and
general welfare, 159 several authorities recommend that municipalities
demonstrate that challenged zoning ordinances serve a "vital and
pressing" government interest.160 This recommendation would bring a
local government's regulatory authority within reasonable limits by fo-
cusing zoning regulations solely on the prevention of harms.' 6 ' The
statute would preclude municipalities from excluding manufactured
154. Cf Your Home, Inc. v. City of Portland, 483 A.2d 735, 738 (Me. 1984) (the
court indicates that relative permanence is not a necessity to establish a dwelling;
plumbing, heating, and wiring must also be considered).
155. See Bourgeois v. St. Tammany, 628 F. Supp. 159, 163 (E.D. La. 1988) (ordi-
nance which addresses manufactured home characteristics as they exist at the time of
delivery, and not as they exist on the land, is invalid); Robinson Township v. Knoll, 410
Mich. 293, 321, 302 N.W.2d 146, 154 (1981) (both conventional homes and prefabri-
cated homes are movable, thus invalidating any distinctions based upon mobility);
Heath v. Parker, 93 N.M. 680, 682, 604 P.2d 818, 820 (1980) (the fact that a manufac-
tured home initially designed to be transported and can be subsequently moved is not
controlling).
156. SANDERS, supra note 99, at 9. The American Planning Report labels distinc-
tions based on mobility as "regulatory abuse." Id. at 4.
157. KMIEC, supra note 12, at § 2.07(4). Although Kmiec wants to ease access to
the courts, he warns that this may subject municipalities to frivolous lawsuits.
158. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
159. Id. at 395.
160. See PRESIDENT'S REPORT, supra note 34, at 199-202 (advocating local zoning
deregulation); see also D. Kmiec, Protecting Vital and Pressing Governmental Interests
- A Proposal for a New Zoning Enabling Act, 30 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 19
(1986).
161. KMIEC, supra note 12, at § 2.07(4). Kmiec suggests that municipalities should
limit their legislation to vital and pressing interests, even if the states fail to redraft their
enabling legislation. Id.
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homes based on obsolete stereotypes. A new state code should require
that new local zoning ordinanceo promote vital and pressing govern-
ment interests. 162 Consequently, manufactured home owners could
successfully challenge regulations which involve merely aesthetic or
other subjective preferences unrelated to health and safety.
A second remedy available to manufactured home owners in chal-
lenging exclusionary or "quasi-exclusionary" zoning ordinances would
shift the burden of validity to the municipality, once a manufactured
home owner demonstrates exclusion in any type of hearing.' 63 The
Euclid court granted the presumption of constitutionality to allow cit-
ies the freedom to incorporate public welfare goals into city plan-
ning.'64 By hiding behind the presumption of validity, municipalities
enacted manufactured housing ordinances which defeat these goals.'
65
Manufactured homes deserve more respect than local municipalities
give to them. Affordable housing is an overwhelming problem across
the country. Municipalities increase the problem by eliminating the
solutions. Unfortunately, local legislatures have reinforced the
prejudices against manufactured housing by consistently excluding this
manufactured housing from desirable areas. To reverse the trend, state
legislatures need to enact pro-manufactured housing legislation, forc-
162. The courts may take matters into their own hands. In City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985), the Supreme Court invalidated an ordi-
nance requiring special use permits for group homes for the mentally retarded. The
Court intensified its scrutiny of the requirement, holding that the ordinance did not
have a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose.
163. KMIEC, supra note 12, at § 2.07(4).
In all proceedings [administrative hearings, governing bodies, judicial reviews], the
political subdivision shall bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the existence of a vital and pressing government interest.., and the
manner in which such regulation promotes that interest.
Id.
164. See PRESIDENT's REPORT, supra note 34, at 200.
At the time Euclid was decided, zoning was appropriate governmental response to
the need to separate noncompatible land uses within the community. In today's
more complex environment, zoning has been employed to do far more. It is used
not only to separate land uses but also to exclude people from the community.
Id.
165. See Delogu, supra note 93, at 74. The author states that municipal officials
have no great constitutional insights on which to give privileged status to the constitu-
tional interpretations of their ordinances, and suggesting that their interpretations may
be more suspect than a federal or state legislatures' interpretations. Id.
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ing municipalities to accept manufactured housing for what it is: a
safe, affordable, attractive housing alternative.
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